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The Justifiable Need Requirement is Not Justifiable
By: Victoria Tengelics

I.

Introduction

The Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms” has been the subject of heated debate
in this country. Through two crucial cases heard between 2008 and 2010, District of Columbia v
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), the
Supreme Court changed the landscape of Second Amendment law but left many questions
unanswered.

Although the Supreme Court asserted that citizens have the right to protect

themselves in their home with the use of a handgun, the Court did not opine as to the extent of
the protection outside the home or the proper standard of review.1
Whether the Second Amendment provides the right to carry a gun for personal safety in
public, and under what circumstances the right applies, has become an issue of importance for
gun owners in states where the permitting scheme is discretionary.

Under the licensing

requirements in New Jersey, Maryland, New York, California, and Hawaii, applicants must show
that a specific threat or need for protection exists before a permit to carry a firearm in public will
be issued (the statutes use terms such as “justifiable need,” “good cause,” “good-and-substantial
reason” etc.).2 While the definition of these terms differs depending on the state that is applying

1

District of Columbia v. Heller,554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the right to bear arms is an individual right);
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (holding that Second Amendment applies to the states); see also,
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 88 – 89 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v.
Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
2
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014)
(challenge to New Jersey’s requirement to show “justifiable need” in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in
public); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013) (challenge to
Maryland’s requirement to show “good-and-substantial reason in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in
public); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v.
Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (challenge to New York’s requirement to show “proper cause” in order to obtain a
permit to carry a fire arm in public); Peruta v County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 2015
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it, “they are essentially the same-the applicant must show a special need for self-defense
distinguishable from that of the population at large, often through a specific and particularized
threat of harm.”3
In those circuits where states have licensing regimens that include these subjective
requirements, a circuit split had emerged as to whether the discretionary requirement of “good
cause” violates the constitutional right to “bear arms” under the Second Amendment.4

In

February 2014, the Ninth Circuit became the fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to weigh in on the
issue of whether a state may require “justifiable need,” “good cause,” or “proper cause,” etc.
before issuing a permit to carry a handgun in public.5 In a three - judge panel opinion the Ninth
Circuit held in, Peruta v. County of San Diego,6 that California’s “good cause” requirement, as
applied in San Diego County was unconstitutional.7 On March 26, 2015, the Ninth Circuit
vacated the February 2014 opinion in Peruta v. County of San Diego and voted to re-hear the
matter en banc.8 The new hearing will be held in San Francisco in the third week of June, 2015.9

U.S. App. LEXIS 4941 (9th Cir. March 26, 2015) (challenge to San Diego County, California’s application of
California’s “good cause” requirement in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in public); HAW. REV. STAT.
§134-9 (2015) (Hawaii’s statute requiring “an applicant [to] show[s] reason to fear injury to the applicant’s person
or property”);
3
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 442 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v.
Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).
4
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014)
(challenge to New Jersey’s requirement to show “justifiable need” in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in
public- court upheld the requirement); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
422 (2013) (challenge to Maryland’s requirement to show “good-and-substantial reason in order to obtain a permit
to carry a firearm in public – court upheld the requirement); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd
Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (challenge to New York’s
requirement to show “proper cause” in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in public – court upheld the
requirement); Peruta v County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4941
(9th Cir. March 26, 2015) (challenge to San Diego County, California’s application of California’s requirement to
show “good cause” in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in public – court struck down the requirement);
5
Peruta v County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4941 (9th Cir.
March 26, 2015).
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1175.
8
Peruta v County of San Diego, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4941 (9th Cir. March 26, 2015).
9
Bob Egelko, Concealed Carry Law Gets New Court Date; Panel to Review Ruling by Appeals Court in ’14, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 27, 2015, at D1.
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In addition to the differing opinions concerning the constitutionality of the “good cause”
discretionary requirement, the circuit courts have also applied different levels of scrutiny.10
This Note will focus specifically on the constitutionality of the requirement to show
“justifiable need” before being granted a right to carry permit and the level of scrutiny that
should apply to the question. This Note concludes that the proper standard of review is a
heightened form of intermediate scrutiny in which the court considers all evidence on the effect
of the legislation. Under this standard, both the rights of the individual and the interests of the
government are addressed. Applying heightened intermediate scrutiny to the justifiable need
requirement, this Note then determines that the requirement is unconstitutional, as it is not a
reasonable fit to the substantial interest of the government.
Part II provides background information including a description of different state licensing
schemes and a brief history of the right to carry. Part III presents an overview of the circuits that
have addressed the specific issue of whether it is permissible for a state to require an individual
to show justifiable need before being issued a permit to carry a handgun in public. This will be
followed, in Part IV, by a discussion of the constitutional standards of review and how they have
been applied to the Second Amendment. Part V analyzes the justifiable need requirement under
intermediate scrutiny, concluding that the Supreme Court should find the requirement
impermissible as unreasonably burdensome on individual’s Second Amendment rights.
II.

Background
This Part discusses the varying state requirements for handgun permits as well as the

historical background underlying the current decisions on the right to carry a firearm for
protection. The permitting scheme in most states includes a specific set of standards that, if met,

Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 324, (6th Cir. 2014). vacated, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638
(6th Cir. April 21, 2015).
10

3

requires an individual be allowed a permit to carry.11 In a minority of states, law enforcement
(or other licensing authority) has discretion, based on the “need” of the applicant, to approve or
deny a permit application.12 While historical analysis of case law from the time of the country’s
founding indicates there is a preference towards open carry of firearms, until recently,
discretionary permitting schemes were not directly reviewed.13
A. State Permitting Schemes
Forty-four states currently allow individuals to openly carry a handgun; fourteen of those
states require a permit.14 However, most states require a permit to carry a concealed firearm.15
Permit requirements can be divided into two classes: shall issue and may issue. Under a “shall
issue,” regime, unless there is a specific excluding factor such as felony convictions, the permit
to carry must be issued.16 “In the forty shall-issue States, permitting officials must grant an
application for handgun carry permits so long as the applicant satisfies certain objective criteria,
such as a background check and completion of a safety course. In these jurisdictions, a general
desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a handgun.”17 The “may issue” licensing scheme is
a discretionary class, allowing government officials discretion to decide, sometimes with little
judicial review, who may carry a gun.18 Only nine states follow a “may-issue” regime.19

11

Drake, 724 F.3d at 441-442 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Nicholas Moeller, Note, The Second Amendment Beyond The Doorstep: Concealed Carry Post-Heller, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2014).
13
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace,
133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); see also, Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century
Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486 (2014) (arguing that open carry is the only form of firearm carry that is
constitutionally protected).
14
Open Carry Map, OpenCarry.org, http://www.opencarry.org/?page_id=103 (last visited April 26, 2015). .
15
Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE
L.J. 1486, 1498 (2014).
16
Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 722 (2007).
17
Drake, 724 F.3d at 441- 442 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).).
18
Moeller, supra note 12, at 1405.
19
Meltzer, supra note 15, at 1498.
12
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Another distinction made in the right to carry context are the differences between open
carry and concealed carry. The advantages of open carry are that people are put on notice that
there is an armed person in their midst. However, people are more likely to be afraid or
disconcerted by the visible presence of a weapon; this causes many people to prefer to carry
concealed weapons.20 While carrying a concealed weapon dissipates the fear some feel by
seeing an openly carried firearm, critics argue that if the weapon can’t be seen, people are not
aware of the possible danger and there is more temptation for the carrier to act nefariously. 21 On
the other hand, the Seventh Circuit argued that “knowing that many law-abiding citizens are
walking the streets armed may make criminals timid.”22 There are not conclusive answers to the
question of whether allowing citizens to carry weapons, either open or concealed, increases or
decreases crime rates.23

However, based on the data available, there appears to be little

correlation between gun ownership and murder rates24 nor does data establish that allowing the
right to carry in public will increase crime rates in any impactful manner.25
B. Historical Analysis
Both those supporting the right to carry firearms and those contending that governments are
entitled to regulate under the Second Amendment have used history as far back as medieval
times to defend their position. As with many topics that provoke intense feelings, history can
often be wielded to support multiple arguments. The following section provides an overview of
the case law and other historical references that have been used by the courts that have addressed
the “justifiable need” issue.
20

Eugene Volokh, Symposium: The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms After D.C. v. Heller:
Implementing The Right To Keep and Bear Arms For Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework And A Research
Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1521 (2009).
21
Id. at 1523.
22
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012).
23
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1465-66; see also, Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012).
24
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1466.
25
Moore, 702 F.3d at 937.
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The Supreme Court in Heller conducted a historical review of post-ratification cases
because an inquiry into “the public understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment
or ratification is a critical tool of constitutional interpretation”26 The Ninth Circuit also relied
heavily on history to support its contention that the Second Amendment was meant to protect an
individual’s right to carry a weapon for personal defense.27 The Ninth Circuit determined that
proper analysis included a review focusing significantly on state courts at the time of the
enactment who viewed the right to bear arms, as the Supreme Court does, as an individual right
to self-defense rather than a militia-based right.28 This proposed review differs from the position
taken by other circuit courts that addressed the justifiable need issue; in those cases only a very
brief mention of the history was made or it was not addressed at all.29
The following is a brief history of the treatment of the right to bear arms by the state courts
starting after ratification of the Second Amendment and ending in the late nineteenth century. In
1822, Kentucky’s highest state court, in Bliss v. Commonwealth,30 interpreted the right to bear
arms very broadly finding that “[a]n act needn’t amount to a complete destruction of the right to
be forbidden by the explicit language of the constitution since any statute that diminish[ed] or
impair[ed the right] as it existed when the constitution was formed would also be void.” 31 The
court therefore struck down the law at issue which banned concealed carry.32 Although in 1840

26

Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1173. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008)).
Id. at 1151, 1167; . see also, Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 449 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting); see
also, Volokh, supra note 19, at 1464-65.
28
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1174 -75.
29
Id. at 1174. see also, Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3rd Cir. 2013) cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian,
134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) ), cert. denied sub nom.
Kachalsky v. Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir. Md. 2013) cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013).
30
Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822).
31
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1156. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90, 92 (1822)).
32
Id. (citing Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 92. (1822)).
27
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the Supreme Court of Alabama in State v. Reid33 allowed a complete ban on concealed carry of
firearms, it reminded lawmakers that legislation that “amounts to a destruction of the right, or
which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence,
would be clearly unconstitutional.”34 Demonstrating a different perspective, in 1842 in State v.
Buzzard, 35 the Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld “restrictions on carrying weapons for selfdefense as permissible police-power regulations.”36

Taken together, the separate majority

opinions regard the right secured by the Second Amendment as, not an individual right, but as a
right to bear arms for sole purpose of militia service.37 The dissent in this case found the
majority’s proposition to “deem the right to be valueless and not worth preserving.”38 In 1846,
the Georgia Supreme Court in Nunn v. State39 struck down a law that prohibited both concealed
and open carry holding that a restriction on carrying a weapon is valid only as long “as it does
not deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-defence, or of his constitutional right to keep
and bear arms.”40 Four years later, in State v. Chandler,41 the Louisiana Supreme Court used a
similar rationale to uphold a law banning concealed weapons when open carry was not
restricted.42 In 1871, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Andrews v. State43 found that although the
right to bear arms was an individual right the main purpose under the Tennessee Constitution

33

State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840).
Id. at 1158(quoting State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840)); see also, .Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 449 (3rd Cir. 2013)
(Hardiman, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).).
35
State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
36
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1159, (citing State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842)).
37
Id. at 1159, (citing State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 22, 32 (1842)).
38
State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 35 (Ark. 1842) (Lacy, J., dissenting).
39
Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
40
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1158-59, (quoting Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (emphasis in original).
41
State v. Chandler, 5 La.Ann. 489 (1850).
42
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1159 (citing State v. Chandler, 5 La.Ann. 489 (1850); see also, Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426,
449 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).
43
Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871); see also, see also, Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1157
(9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4941 (9th Cir. March 26, 2015).
34

7

was for the purpose of promoting an efficient militia and common defense.44 For that reason, the
court found that a ban with regard to the carrying of “pocket” pistols is constitutional as it was
not generally a weapon used in the military at the time.45 However, the court held that the
legislature can regulate, but not ban, the carrying of firearms which could be “adapted to the
usual equipment of the soldier” and therefore is needed in peacetime to enable him to be a more
efficient marksman.46 In 1878, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in Wilson v. State,47 changed its
position from the Buzzard ruling when they stated that “to prohibit the citizen from wearing or
carrying a war arm, except upon his own premises or when on a journey traveling through the
country with baggage, or when acting as or in aid of an officer, is an unwarranted restriction
upon his constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”48 Not all states agreed with the view that at
least some form of public carry of weapons was required; “at least four states once banned the
carrying of pistols and similar weapons in public, both in a concealed or an open manner.” 49 As
this history shows, most states in which the courts viewed the right as being an individual right
protected at least some form of the right to carry.
Other scholars and gun rights advocates focus solely on the language of the Second
Amendment, specifically the term “keep and bear arms.” “Noah Webster’s 1828 first edition of
An American Dictionary of the English Language shows several subtle variations on the verb
“bear” in the sense of “to carry” or “to wear”; the primary definition is universal “to carry; … as,

44

Id. at 182.
Id. at 186.
46
Id. at 186.
47
Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (Ark. 1878).
48
Id. at 560; see also, Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 2015 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4941 (9th Cir. March 26, 2015).
49
Kachalsky, v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace,
133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
.
45
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‘they bear [it] upon the shoulder.”50 The Ninth Circuit also found support from historical
definitions of the term to “bear arms” gleaned from legal commentaries from the time of the
ratification of the Second Amendment which were also cited by Heller.51 These commentaries
equated the right to arm oneself for protection with “the natural right of resistance and selfpreservation.”52
Many scholars point to English common law, notably the Statute of Northampton, as
providing an answer as to the viewpoints of our founding fathers and the early colonists.53 The
statute “provided that unless on King's business no man could go nor ride armed by night nor by
day, in Fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part
elsewhere."54 This statute and commentary on it has been interpreted by the Seventh Circuit as
being concerned with “armed gangs, thieves, and assassins rather than with indoors versus
outdoors as such.”55 However, “the statute and its implications for the Second Amendment are
fiercely debated in the scholarship.”56 Further, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged St. George
Tucker’s commentary on the American Constitution, in which Tucker asserted that “[t]he right to
armed self-defense. . . is the first law of nature, and any law prohibiting any person from bearing
arms crossed the constitutional line.”57 Although these historical references shed some light on
how the Second Amendment was viewed at the time it was enacted, they are not instructive on

Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What did “Bear Arms” Mean in the Second Amendment? 6 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 511, 520 (2008).
51
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1153-54.
52
Id. at 1154. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594 (2008)).
53
Meltzer, supra note 18, at 1507.
54
Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 (citing 2 Edw. III, c. 3 (1328).) (internal citations omitted).
55
Id. (citing Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 162 (1797)). (“Chief Justice Coke interpreted the
statute to allow a person to possess weapons inside the home but not to "assemble force, though he be extremely
threatened, to go with him to church, or market, or any other place.").
56
Meltzer, supra note 15, at1507.
57
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1154. (internal quotations omitted). (citing St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries:
With Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the
Commonwealth of Virginia 289 (1803)).
50

9

whether the right to carry a firearm for defense can be limited to specific and known threats of
danger.
Even with the same facts, some courts as well as scholars, view the history as supporting
either complete or partial prohibitions on the right to carry a concealed weapon. In his March
2014 article, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment,
Jonathan Meltzer asserted the view that these early decisions specifically support open carry
only:
“The cases, while differing subtly in their discussion of the right to carry, point
decisively toward a robust right to carry weapons openly for self-defense but no
right at all to carry such weapons concealed. Indeed, these cases are notable for
their understanding of the right to keep and bear arms as not encompassing
concealed carry.”58
While there does appear to be a preference towards open carry over concealed carry in
these cases, the issue addressed by these courts was not whether there was a right specifically to
concealed carry or open carry. Rather the issues were whether there was a right to carry at all
and if there was such a right, to what extent does the legislature have the ability to restrict that
right? What history does not address on point is the question of whether a state can require an
applicant for a license to carry to “demonstrate[e] a special need for self-protection”59
III.

Circuit Split over Justifiable Need Requirement

Although other courts have addressed the right to carry weapons in public, only four have
specifically addressed the question of “justifiable need.” The following is a summary of those
cases and their holdings.

58
59

Meltzer, supra note 15, at 1511.
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91.
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A. Second Circuit - Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 2012)
The Second Circuit addressed New York’s statute regarding obtaining a permit to carry a
concealed firearm in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester. New York’s statue allows for “shall
issue” permitting for people in occupations such as bank messengers, certain judges and
individuals who work in prisons or jails.60 The statute also allows for possession in the home or
“in a place of business by a merchant or storekeeper.”61

However, outside of the occupations

expressly listed in the statute, all other individuals must show that they have “proper cause.” 62
New York’s definition of “proper cause” is not included in the statute but the New York State
courts have held that it includes target practice and hunting as proper causes for requesting a
license to carry (licenses of this kind are restricted to only those purposes).63

If the interest is

for self-defense then the person must show that they have a “special need” beyond a general
concern for protection of themselves or their property that is “distinguishable from that of the
general community or of persons engaged in the same profession.’64 The decision as to whether
proper cause has been shown is made by licensing officers who are “vested with considerable
discretion.”65 “Every application triggers a local investigation by police into the applicant’s
mental health history, criminal history, moral character, and in the case of a carry license,
representations of proper cause.”66 Although judicial review is available to those who are denied
a license, deference is shown to the government and the decision will only be overturned if it is
found to be arbitrary and capricious.67

60

Kachalsky, v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace,
133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
61
Id. at 86.
62
Id. at 85.
63
Id. at 86.
64
Id. at 86, 92.
65
Id. at 87.
66
Id. at 86.
67
Id.

11

New York began regulating firearms prior to the Constitution.68 Early firearms law in New
York regulated who could use firearms, when and where they could be used, and even how gun
power can be stored.69 In New York a license must be obtained in order to own a firearm, which
includes revolvers, pistols and short barrel rifles and shotguns but does not include standard
rifles or shotguns.70 Licensees must be “over twenty-one years of age, of good moral character,
without a history of crime or mental illness, and "concerning whom no good cause exists for the
denial of the license."71 Since 1913, New York has had a statewide licensing program for the
carry of firearms in public; the carry license requirements have always mandated that applicants
show “good moral character, and that proper cause exists for the issuance [of the license].”72
Under New York law open carry of handguns is not allowed.73
Five applicants, whose applications were rejected on the basis of “[f]ailure to show any facts
demonstrating a need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general public,” brought
this action asserting that the requirement to show proper cause violates their Second Amendment
rights.74 Of the five applicants, only one actually attempted to comply with the requirement.75
The court found the need she listed, that her risk of violence was increased by the fact that she is
a transgender female, was not specific enough and needed to be a direct threat instead of a
general concern.76 Included among the other four applicants who did not list a specific threat
was a “federal law enforcement office with the U.S. Coast Guard.”77

68

Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 84.
Id.
70
Id. at 85.
71
Id. at 86.
72
Id. at 85. see also, NY PENAL LAW Penal § 400.00(2)(f) (2014).
73
Id. at 86.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 86.
77
Id.
69
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The court noted the decisions of the Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald are controlling
but not decisive because “Heller was never meant to clarify the entire field of Second
Amendment Jurisprudence.”78 Although the court stressed that individuals enjoy the greatest
protection of the right to keep and bear arms in their homes, it acknowledged that the right
extends outside the home.79

While not as extensive as in Heller or as the Ninth Circuit’s

analysis, the court conducted a historical review and found that “[h]istory and tradition do not
speak with one voice here.”80 Discussing many of the cases introduced in the previous Part, the
court determined that, while there were some courts from the nineteenth century which held that
at least some form of carry in public was appropriate, there were also at least four states at that
time that banned public carry altogether regardless of the manner.81 Even the states that did
allow concealed carry of firearms often regulated them and prohibited carrying them at certain
times, certain occasions or in certain places.82 Further, though Heller did not address the issue of
public carry directly, the court did note “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the
question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second
Amendment or state analogues.”83 The court pointed out that there were states with concealed
carry bans that had limited exceptions, very similar to New York’s proper cause requirement,
which centered on specific occupations or activities that would put the person in harm’s way.84
“[S]tates have long recognized a countervailing and competing set of concerns with regard to
handgun ownership and use in public.”85

78

Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 86.
Id. at 89.
80
Id. at 90.
81
Id. at 90.
82
Id. at 94-95.
83
Id. at 95, (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)).
84
Id. at 96.
85
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96.
79
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The court determined that the most appropriate standard of review in this case was
intermediate scrutiny “because our tradition so clearly indicates a substantial role for state
regulations of the carrying of firearms in public.”86 Based on its reading of Heller and the prior
historical analysis, the court advised that the right to carry in public is not a “core” right as
addressed in Heller and therefore is not entitled to heightened scrutiny.87 The court found that
the right that was infringed upon in Heller was one that was based in the home which is “special
and subject to limited state regulation.”88 Moreover, “outside the home, firearm rights have
always been more limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in
self-defense.”89 Choosing a different level of scrutiny for restrictions on the Second Amendment
right within the home versus outside the home is consistent with the standard of review question
in other constitutional contexts where there are varying degrees of rights and burdens. 90
“Heighted scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that (like the complete prohibition on
handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding
citizens to possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes).”91 The court
concluded that rational basis was not appropriate because even though Heller did not actually set
down a level of review, it ruled out rational basis review.92 The court found that “this is
precisely the type of argument that should be addressed by examining the purpose and impact of
the law in light of the Plaintiff’s Second Amendment right.”93
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The court determined that, under intermediate scrutiny, New York’s proper cause
requirement was constitutional.94 There was no question that New York has a “compelling
governmental interest[] in public safety and crime prevention.”95 The question under
intermediate review was “whether the proper cause requirement is substantially related to these
interests.”96

To answer this issue the court gave “substantial deference to the predictive

judgments of the legislature” as to the impact of the proper cause regulation on the interest.97
Although there are scientific studies on both sides of the issue, the court found that “it is the
legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy judgments.” 98 Further,
the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument that the proper cause standard was arbitrary and not
a perfect fit to the government’s interests.99 According to the court, the right to self-defense is
not limitless and it is within New York’s authority to regulate the right. 100 The court reiterated
that the fit need only be substantially related and by “restricting handgun possession in public to
those who have a reason to possess the weapon for a lawful purpose” the statute meets that
threshold.101
B. Fourth Circuit – Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).
In Woollard v. Gallagher, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Maryland District Court’s ruling
and found that Maryland’s “good-and-substantial-reason” requirement is constitutional.102
Maryland requires all but certain classes of people to have a “permit issued . . . before the person
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carries, wears, or transports a handgun.”103

According to the statute, permits must be issued

once a finding is made that “the applicant is an adult without a disqualifying criminal record,
alcohol or drug addiction, or propensity for violence” and the applicant has shown that they have
“good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the
permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”104 Authority to issue
permits has been assigned to the Handgun Permit Unit of the Maryland State Police.105 The
Handgun Permit Unit has categorized “good and substantial reason” showings as follows:
(1) for business activities, either at the business owner's request or on behalf of an
employee; (2) for regulated professions (security guard, private detective,
armored car driver, and special police officer); (3) for "assumed risk" professions
(e.g., judge, police officer, public defender, prosecutor, or correctional officer);
and (4) for personal protection.106
Although the first three categories are self-evident, the Handgun Permit Unit considers more than
a general concern for personal protection or a “vague threat” when addressing the fourth
category.107 Even if there is a specific threat listed, the Unit then reviews the threat against the
following four factors:
“(1) the "nearness" or likelihood of a threat or presumed threat; (2) whether the
threat can be verified; (3) whether the threat is particular to the applicant, as
opposed to the average citizen; (4) if the threat can be presumed to exist, what is
the basis for the presumption; and (5) the length of time since the initial threat
occurred.”108
These factors are “nonexhaustive” and therefore the Permit Unit “takes the applicant's entire
situation into account when considering whether a 'good and substantial reason' exists.”109 The
permit expires two years after it is issued and can be renewed for successive three year periods
103
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but each time all the requirements must be met including the “good and substantial cause”
requirement.110 If a permit is denied, applicants may appeal through administrative channels
and if they are denied further they can seek judicial review.111
This case was brought by Raymond Woollard who was denied a renewal of his permit to
carry which was first issued in 2003 and subsequently renewed in 2006 but was denied in 2009
for a lack of “good and substantial cause.”112 The initial permit was issued after Mr. Woollard’s
son-in-law, who was high on drugs, broke into his rural Baltimore County home on Christmas
Eve 2002.113 Mr. Woollard and his son were able to subdue the son-in-law by use of guns they
had on the premises but it took the police two-and-a-half hours to arrive once called.114 The sonin-law “received a sentence of probation for the . . . incident but was subsequently incarcerated
for probation violations.”115 He was released in 2006 and Woollard was able to renew his permit
to carry shortly thereafter.116 However, in 2009 the permit was denied for failure to show goodand-substantial reason.117 In their decision, the Handgun Permit Review Board reasoned that the
only evidence Mr. Woollard gave as a showing of a specific threat was the 2002 incident with his
son-in-law even though he had not had contact with him since the incident.118 Because he had
not provided any evidence of a current threat, the Permit Review Board denied his appeal.119
The district court awarded summary judgement to Mr. Woollard and the Second Amendment
Foundation finding that “the individual right to possess and carry weapons for self-defense is not
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limited to the home.”120

The district court held that the “good and substantial reason”

requirement “is insufficiently tailored to the State's interest in public safety and crime
prevention, and impermissibly infringes the right to keep and bear arms" and enjoined
enforcement of the requirement.121

The Fourth Circuit entered a stay pending appeal and

accelerated the appellate process to resolve the issue.122
The court noted that under Heller, the right to bear arms is an individual right for the purpose
of self-defense but stated that the “core” of that right lies within the home.123 The court found
the following test used by other circuits as being applicable:
“[T]he first question is whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct
falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee. This historical
inquiry seeks to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be
within the scope of the right at the time of ratification. If it was not, then the
challenged law is valid. If the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was
within the scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood, then we
move to the second step of applying an appropriate form of means-end
scrutiny.”124
However, the court determined that both steps are not required in order to answer the issue and
followed the Second Circuit’s lead by simply stating that “we merely assume that the Heller right
exists outside the home and that such right . . . has been infringed.” 125

The court applied an

intermediate scrutiny standard ultimately finding that the “good and substantial reason
requirement . . . is reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental interest.”126
The court began its analysis of the standard of review by determining that the government’s
interest in reducing the crime rate in Maryland, which at the time was very high when compared
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to other states, was a substantial governmental interest.127

Based on past precedent recognizing

a distinction between the right to keep arms in the home versus rights outside the home, the court
also rejected the Appellees argument that the right to carry a firearm for self-defense is a
fundamental right.128 Because it found that the government had a substantial interest, the court
moved on to analyze whether the “good and substantial reason” requirement was a reasonable fit
to that interest.129
In determining whether Maryland’s requirement was a reasonable fit to the government’s
substantial interest, the court first looked at Mr. Woollard’s situation and determined that he had
options for transporting and carrying his handguns under the exception to Maryland’s statute.130
However, he is barred from carrying his handgun in places were a permit is required unless he
can meet all of Maryland’s requirements including the “good and substantial reason”
requirement which he could do by showing an “apprehended danger.”131 The court found that
the government’s interests overrides Mr. Woollard’s because the State showed that the
“requirement advances the objectives of protecting public safety and preventing crime because it
reduces the number of handguns carried in public.”132 The State set forth the following ways in
which reducing the number of handguns being carried reduces crime:
Decreasing the availability of handguns to criminals via theft . . .Lessening “the
likelihood that basic confrontations between individuals would turn deadly . . .
Averting the confusion, along with the potentially tragic consequences thereof
that can result from the presence of a third person with a handgun during a
confrontation between a police officer and a criminal suspect . . .Curtailing the
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876-77 (In 2009 Maryland has the “eighth highest violent crime rate, third highest
homicide rate and the second highest robbery rate of any state”).
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presence of handguns during routine police-citizen encounters. . .Reducing the
number of handgun sightings that must be investigated . . .Facilitating the
identification of those persons carrying handguns who pose a menace . . .133
The court also stated that the “good and substantial reason” requirement does not prevent
someone who does have a specific need for self-defense from protecting themselves within the
law.134 In discounting the Appellees arguments as to the flaws in the State’s reasoning the court
showed deference to the legislature’s findings.135 The court therefore upheld Maryland’s “good
and substantial reason” requirement as constitutional.136
C. Third Circuit - Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 2013).
The Third Circuit reviewed New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement in Drake v. Filko
and found it to be a constitutional burden on the Second Amendment right to bear arms.137
Under New Jersey’s Handgun Permit Law, anyone seeking to carry a handgun in public for selfdefense must obtain a license by applying to either the chief of police in their town or the
superintendent of the state police.138 The law provides that: “[n]o application shall be approved
by the chief police officer or the superintendent unless the applicant demonstrates that he is not
subject to any of the disabilities set forth in 2C:58–3c. [which includes numerous criminal
history, age and mental health requirements], that he is thoroughly familiar with the safe
handling and use of handguns, and that he has a justifiable need to carry a handgun.”139 In New
Jersey “justifiable need” is defined as: “[T]he urgent necessity for self-protection, as evidenced
by specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life
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that cannot be avoided by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun.”140 This
standard was further defined by the New Jersey Supreme Court: “Generalized fears for personal
safety are inadequate, and a need to protect property alone does not suffice.”141
Four applicants, “a group which included a reserve sheriff’s deputy, a civilian FBI employee,
an owner of a business that restocks ATM machines and carries large amounts of cash, and a
victim of an interstate kidnapping,”142 were denied permits on the basis of a lack of justifiable
need. They appealed the district court’s ruling that New Jersey’s law was constitutional; arguing
that “(1) the Second Amendment secures a right to carry arms in public for self-defense; (2) the
“justifiable need” standard of the Handgun Permit Law is an unconstitutional prior restraint; and
(3) the standard fails any level of means-end scrutiny a court may apply.”143
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the decision under a two-part test under which
the court first determines “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”144 If the conduct is found not to fall
within the scope further review is unnecessary.145 However, if the conduct is protected by the
Second Amendment then “means-end scrutiny” is applied.146 The court concluded that the
conduct did not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment because the New Jersey
requirement that applicants show a “justifiable need” qualified as a “presumptively lawful” and
“longstanding” regulation and therefore was excluded from the Heller ruling.147 In Heller, the
Supreme Court specifically listed certain “long-standing prohibitions”, such as restricting felons’
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rights to possess a firearm, as “presumptively lawful.”148 The Supreme Court noted that the
exceptions they listed were simply examples and not the only possibilities149 but “did not provide
guidance on how to identify other regulations that may qualify.”150 The Third Circuit concluded
that because New Jersey has included “justifiable need” in its laws in some form since 1924 this
provision counted as a long-standing prohibition falling under Heller and did not require Second
Amendment protection.151 Judge Hardiman disagreed with this finding but, as the court also
reviewed the law under the second prong, this Comment will not detail the argument on that
issue.152
Despite finding that the Second Amendment did not apply to New Jersey’s law, the court
proceeded to analyze the law under the second prong of the test, applying a means end test and
finding that “it withstands the appropriate, intermediate level of scrutiny.”153 The State provided
no evidence showing that there was a “reasonable fit” between the “justifiable need” standard
and their goal of assuring public safety.154 The court found that because the standard was
implemented before the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states, legislators
“could not have known that they were potentially burdening protected Second Amendment
conduct” and therefore the fit is not unreasonable just because evidence was not available.155
With regard to the burden the requirement places on the individual, the court found that because
“New Jersey engages in an individualized consideration of each person's circumstances and his
or her objective, rather than subjective, need to carry a handgun in public” it meets this
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requirement as intermediate scrutiny doesn’t require narrow tailoring.156 Based on this and the
fact that other courts have found a reasonable fit for the same type of requirement, the court
found that even under intermediate scrutiny the law would be considered constitutional.157
D. Ninth Circuit - Peruta v County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014).
Coming to a conflicting conclusion, in Peruta v County of San Diego, the Ninth Circuit
found San Diego County’s application of California’s good cause requirement to be
unconstitutional.158 As discussed previously, the Ninth Circuit has since vacated this decision
and will be rehearing the matter en banc.159 A summary of the court’s original opinion is
nevertheless included as it is instructive as to how the court may analyze the matter upon further
review and provides an alternate view of the constitutionality of the justifiable need standard.
California’s statute regulating licenses to carry a concealed weapon requires that “good cause
exists for issuance of the license” but does not define “good cause.”160 California gives authority
to grant licenses for concealed carry to cities and counties with the requirement that they create
and post a written policy containing a summary of the statutes.161 Under San Diego County’s
application of the statute, applicants must “show a sufficiently pressing need for self-protection”
and “demonstrate circumstances that distinguish [him] from the mainstream.”162 Five applicants
challenged this interpretation as an impermissible burden on their Second Amendment right to
bear arms.163
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The court reviewed the matter under the two-step test provided by Heller for reviewing rights
under the Second Amendment: 1) Is the right the applicants are seeking to enforce one that is
within the scope of the Second Amendment protections? and 2) Does the challenged
interpretation infringe upon the right?164

In order to determine whether the right to carry a

concealed weapon outside the home is a right protected by the Second Amendment, the court
addressed both the textual meaning and “public understanding” of the phrase to “keep and bear
arms” and the historical treatment of the scope.165 The court then analyzed the degree to which
the right was burdened by first determining what, or if any, form of scrutiny should be applied.166
The court began its examination of the textual and historical background of the scope by
focusing on the meaning of the term to “bear arms”.167 It found that to “bear” in the context of
the Second Amendment meant not simply to carry, but to carry for the purpose of “being armed
and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.”168 Based
upon this view, the court found it nonsensical that the right would be restricted to one’s home
since you would not carry a loaded firearm throughout your daily routine within the home for
purposes of defending oneself from a confrontation.169 In determining that the right extended
beyond the home, the court also found certain nuances in the Heller and McDonald opinions
strongly suggestive.170 Heller “secures the right to protect[] [oneself] against both public and
private violence, thus extending the right in some form to wherever a person could become
exposed to public or private violence.”171 Both Heller and McDonald refer to the need for
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protection being most critical within the home which implies that there is also a need for
protection outside the home.172 By including “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as school and government buildings” in the list of “presumptively lawful”
restrictions, the court viewed Heller as acknowledging there is a right to carry a firearm outside
the home otherwise it would not have singled them out.173 Most importantly, the court noted that
“both Heller and McDonald identify the core component of the right as self-defense, which
necessarily take[s] place wherever [a] person happens to be.”174
The court delved into a detailed historical analysis of previous treatment of the right to bear
arms, reviewing precedent from the time of ratification to post-civil war time.175 The court first
established that there should be a ranking to how precedent is reviewed, given that Heller
determined that the right to keep and bear arms “is, and has always been, an individual right . . .
oriented to the end of self-defense.”176 Therefore, it grouped historical precedent into three
categories in order of significance:
(1) authorities that understands bearing arms for self-defense to be an
individual right, (2) authorities that understand bearing arms for a purpose other
than self-defense to be an individual right, and (3) authorities that understand
bearing arms not to be an individual right at all.177
The court reviewed case law from early nineteenth-century courts, finding that courts in
the first category, which viewed the right to bear arms as individual right with the purpose of
self-defense, found a ban on both open and concealed carry to be a “destruction of the right”
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granted by the Second Amendment.178 Therefore, the court concluded that “carrying a gun
outside the home for self-defense comes within the meaning of “bear[ing] Arms.”179
The court then addressed the extent to which San Diego County’s application of the
“good cause” requirement burdened the right to bear arms for self-defense in public.180 In order
to determine which level of scrutiny to apply to the issue the court first answered the question of
whether the licensing scheme burdened the right or destroyed it. 181 In California there is not a
permitting scheme for open carry of a firearm and therefore “it is illegal in virtually all
circumstances” to carry a firearm openly regardless of whether it is loaded or not.182 Under
California law, certain classes of people are able to carry a concealed firearm without a permit:
active and retired police officers, military personnel, and retired federal officers.183 Additionally,
a firearm may be carried on private property, places of business or “where hunting is
allowed.”184 California also makes an exception for situations of “immediate, grave danger in
the brief interval before and after the local law enforcement agency, when reasonably possible,
has been notified of the danger and before the arrival of its assistance.”185 Yet, without a permit,
the “typical responsible, law-abiding citizen [of San Diego County is not able] to bear arms in
public for the lawful purpose of self-defense”.186 The only citizens of San Diego County that are
able to carry are those who are included in the exceptions above or those who can show that they
face a “unique risk of harm” under circumstances which differentiate them from the rest of the
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society.187

The court found that the right has been “destroyed when exercise of the right is

limited to a few people, in a few places, at a few times.”188 Because the court determined that
San Diego County’s application of “good cause” destroyed the Second Amendment rights of the
parties, as in Heller, it found the policy per se invalid.189 “A law effecting a “destruction of the
right” rather than merely burdening it is, after all, an infringement under any light.”190
E. Analysis of the courts’ findings
The courts that find the ‘justifiable need” requirement constitutional have a few similarities in
their analysis: none attempt to determine the scope of the Second Amendment and they employ
intermediate scrutiny in a loose manner granting significant deference to the findings of
legislature.191 There are courts that have “applied the [heightened scrutiny] standard so loosely
to firearm cases that it takes on the attributes of rational basis review” because these courts have
“presume[ed] constitutionality with almost unlimited deference to the legislative process, and
accept[ed] justifications based upon speculation rather than evidence.”192 If the purpose of
heightened scrutiny is truly as “Justice O'Connor noted [to] help[] to ensure that . . . the State's
asserted interests are not merely a pretext for exclusionary or anti-competitive restrictions" then
the courts must require more evidence from the legislature.193 With regard to the deference
required to show the legislature, deference is only to be given to the determination of whether a
187
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substantial interest has been affected and whether the statute will positively address the issue.194
However, “when assessing the fit between the asserted interests and the means chosen to
advance them" no such deference is required.195 Unlike the Second, Third and Fourth Circuits,
the Ninth Circuit conducted a full historical review and scope analysis but did not truly apply a
form of scrutiny because it found the right to carry arms in public for self-defense to be a core
right covered by the Second Amendment and therefore, followed Heller’s lead in approaching
the right as having been destroyed thereby finding the application of the “good cause”
requirement per se impermissible.196 While the Ninth Circuit made mention of intermediate
scrutiny, it criticized the applications made by the other courts but did not truly apply the
scrutiny itself.197 The courts should apply intermediate scrutiny as it was intended, conducting a
full review of the government’s findings to ensure that the “justifiable need” requirement is a
reasonable fit and reduces crime more than background checks, mental health reports,
fingerprinting and other measures alone do.
IV.

Standards of Review as Applied to Second Amendment
As shown in the previous Part, the standard of review a court chooses and how they apply

it is crucial to the determination of our rights as citizens. Those courts that granted great
deference to the government without requiring more evidence as to the reasonable fit between
the requirement of “justifiable need” and State’s substantial interest have allowed the rights
granted by the Second Amendment to the citizens of those states to be diminished. This Part will
begin with a description of the different standards that are applied in the Second Amendment
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context and a recap of how they have been applied to the “justifiable need” issue so far and will
conclude by recommending a heightened form of intermediate scrutiny be used in the future.
A. Description of Applicable Standard of Review Options
Under strict scrutiny the burden on the affected right must be “genuinely necessary to
serve a compelling government interest.”198 The statute must be “narrowly tailored” to address
that interest.199 The burden is unconstitutional if the concerns raised by the government can be
resolved through the use of alternative solutions which are less restrictive and burdensome on the
right then what has already been proposed.200 Justice Scalia argued against strict scrutiny in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), suggesting it “was not appropriate in most free exercise cases because many burdensome
laws were nevertheless necessary for the public welfare” and that many laws would not be able
to meet the “compelling interest” standard and the result would be “courting anarchy.”201
“[U]nder intermediate scrutiny the government must assert a significant, substantial, or
important interest; there must also be a reasonable fit between that asserted interest and the
challenged law, such that the law does not burden more conduct than is reasonably necessary.”202
Intermediate scrutiny balances the safety of the public against the rights of the individual.203
Some courts apply a degree of intermediate scrutiny known as exacting scrutiny which “requires
the challenged law to have a substantial relation to a sufficiently important governmental
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interest, which must reflect the seriousness of the . . . burden on the exercise of a constitutional
right.”204
Another possible standard of review which has been used at the state level is reasonable
regulation which is very similar to intermediate scrutiny. The focus of this standard is on
“whether a restriction is a “reasonable regulation” or a prohibition.”205 While the states find most
regulations constitutional there are some cases where they do strike down those laws that
“substantially burden people’s ability to defend themselves.”206
In contrast to the reasonable regulation and intermediate scrutiny tests, rational basis
review focuses on the rationality of the government’s stated goal. 207 The focus of the rational
basis test is that the regulation is rationally related to the goal thus “a rational legislator could
conclude that banning all firearms furthers public safety.”208

According to one scholar,

“[o]rdinary forms of gun control such as licensing laws, bans on concealed carry, and
prohibitions on particular types of weapons are, . . . attempts to regulate the right rather than
eliminate it and are routinely upheld. So long as a gun control measure is not a total ban on the
right to bear arms, the courts will consider it a mere regulation of the right.”209
B. Intermediate Scrutiny is the Appropriate Standard for Right to Carry Analysis
Although many gun rights activists argue that strict scrutiny is required to protect their
gun ownership, critics reply that by applying strict scrutiny “the legislative duty to protect the
public safety will be profoundly frustrated.”210

However, others contend that the distinction

between intermediate and strict scrutiny is irrelevant because the main interests that gun control
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laws serve, prevention of “violent crime, injury and death” are compelling interests that would
overcome the strict scrutiny standard.211 “Under this general approach, severe restrictions on the
"core" right have been thought to trigger a kind of strict scrutiny, while less severe burdens have
been

reviewed

under

some

lesser

form

of

heightened

scrutiny.”212

Despite this, applying strict scrutiny to gun control regulations could result in presumably
reasonable regulations being struck down due to the requirement that the law be narrowly
tailored.213 In Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,214 the Sixth Circuit determined that strict
scrutiny is the proper analysis to apply to gun control legislation because:
“[First] [t]he Supreme Court has by now been clear and emphatic that the
right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right necessary to our system of
ordered liberty . . . Although it is true that strict scrutiny is not always implicated
when a fundamental right is at stake, the Supreme Court has suggested that there
is a presumption in favor of strict scrutiny when a fundamental right is involved. .
. [Second] the courts of appeals originally adapted the levels of scrutiny of Second
Amendment jurisprudence by looking to the First Amendment doctrine but that
First Amendment doctrine reflects a preference for strict scrutiny more often than
for intermediate scrutiny. . . [Third] strict scrutiny is preferable because this is a
doctrinal area in which the Court has not simply refrained from suggesting that
lesser review is called for but one in which it has strongly indicated that
intermediate scrutiny should not be employed. . . Fourth . . . because it has no
basis in the Constitution. Both the Court and the academy have said as much.
The Heller Court's reasons for explicitly rejecting rational-basis scrutiny apply
equally to intermediate scrutiny. The Court rejected rational-basis scrutiny
for Second Amendment challenges because it "is a mode of analysis we have used
when
evaluating
laws
under
constitutional
commands
that
are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws ”215

Intermediate scrutiny appears to make sense if the right to protect oneself in public is
seen as an important, but not fundamental, right that requires there to be more than a simple
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relation between the law and its purpose. Requiring a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis
but lower than strict scrutiny will guard against arbitrary laws that are not supported by evidence
only if the courts apply the deference properly.216 However, the courts, when reviewing whether
the need is important, accord substantial deference to the [legislature’s] predictive judgments.”217
Conversely if intermediate scrutiny is applied regulations that are too burdensome may be found
to still be a “reasonable fit” when there are less restrictive ways for the government to meet their
goal.218
As discussed previously, the Second, Third and Fourth Circuits applied intermediate
scrutiny loosely, choosing not to insist upon specific evidence that showed the regulations in
place will actually have a positive effect upon the substantial interest.219 “In applying a strict
version of intermediate review, courts should demand that empirical data be presented that
supports a gun restriction.”220 The Ninth Circuit on the other hand applied Heller almost directly
finding that the application of “good cause” as San Diego County interprets it is per se
impermissible.221
While the Heller Court did not specifically set a standard of review for the Second
Amendment, by addressing both the burden of and the necessity for regulation and weighing the
interests, it at least appeared to lean towards intermediate scrutiny.222
“Earlier in the opinion, the [Heller] Court similarly justified striking down
the handgun ban on the grounds that the ban is a “severe restriction.” In the
process, the Court favorably quoted an old case distinguishing permissible
“regulati[on]” from impermissible destruction of the right and from impermissible
laws that make guns wholly useless for the purpose of defence. The Court did not
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discuss what analysis would be proper for less “severe” restrictions, likely
because the facts did not require such a discussion. But its analysis suggested that
the severity of the burden was important.”223
Both the history and text of the Second Amendment show that the right to carry a
firearm for self-defense is an individual right protected by the Second Amendment.
While it is a fundamental right, the government has an undeniably strong interest to
regulate that right to protect the public. However, this interest does not entitle them to
run roughshod over the rights of the individual. While it is tempting to apply strict
scrutiny to the right to carry a firearm for protection in public, courts should be cautious
to ensure that a reasonable law that actually would protect the public is not struck down
because it is not “narrowly tailored.” . Applying a heightened form of intermediate
scrutiny that requires courts to seriously consider all the evidence of the effect of the
legislation, rather than grant substantial deference, will ensure that the protections needs
of both the individual and the government will be given correct consideration.
V.

The Justifiable Need Requirement is Unconstitutional

Whether the requirement to show a “justifiable need” is reviewed under strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny, the result is that the requirement burdens the right more than is reasonably
necessary to meet the government’s goal, especially when applied to both open and concealed
carry permits.

“Only by engaging in a true fit analysis are we faithful both to the Supreme

Court’s rejection of naked interest balancing and to its reminder that the Second Amendment is
“not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose.”224
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In the New Jersey case, the appellants included “reserve sheriff’s deputy who wishes to
carry a gun for self-defense while off duty, . . . a civilian FBI employee who received specific
information that a terrorist organization might target him or his family, . . . [and] an owner of an
ATM restocking company who routinely carries large amounts of cash”225 If people with
circumstances and credentials such as this cannot obtain a permit to carry a concealed gun who
would be eligible? This demonstrates, at least in New Jersey, how high the bar really is under
the justifiable need requirement and calls into question whether there truly is a right to carry
concealed, or open, at all in New Jersey. “Even assuming that New Jersey is correct to conclude
that fewer guns means less crime, a rationing system that burdens the exercise of a fundamental
constitutional right by simply making that right more difficult to exercise cannot be considered
reasonably adapted to a governmental interest because it burdens the right too broadly. The
regulation must be more targeted than that to meet intermediate scrutiny.”226
According to the Crime Prevention Research Center’s July 14th report, the states with mayissue permitting schemes have significantly low numbers of the adult population with permits to
carry.227 In New Jersey, for example, only .02% of the state’s population has a permit to carry. 228
Although this could be because few people in those states wish to carry, looking at this statistic
in conjunction with the facts of Drake v Filko it seems more likely that the process was too
burdensome or there were many denials. “One study undertook to determine the relationships
between firearm homicide, firearm suicide, total homicide, and total suicide, and age
requirements for handgun purchase and possession, "one-gun-a[-]month" laws, "shall issue"
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carry permits, and bans on cheap handguns. No relationships could be found between these laws
and homicide or suicide, except that "shall issue" permits were associated with higher firearm
homicide and homicide rates, but not at a statistically significant level.”229 Additionally, “no
relationship could be found between imposition of the waiting period, or of the background
check, and firearms homicide and suicide, with one exception--that of suicide victims aged fiftyfive or older. That finding was somewhat offset by a rise in nonfirearm suicides, leaving a
modest (though not statistically significant) reduction."230
If measures such as background checks and waiting periods, which are much more related to
the security of the person handling the gun than the requirement that they be able to show that
they are facing a specific threat, do not show a statistically significant change in rates of violence
then it is hard to find a reasonable fit for the “justifiable need” requirement to the substantial
interest of the government in protecting the public from those carrying firearms lawfully.
VI.

Conclusion

The Second Amendment allows individuals the right to carry a concealed firearm for the
purpose of self-defense. Although some form of gun control is necessary and reasonable, the
requirement of justifiable need, good cause or proper cause creates an unreasonable burden on
the right and therefore is unconstitutional under any measure of scrutiny.
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